We study complete approximations of an ontology formulated in a non-Horn description logic (DL) such as ALC in a Horn DL such as EL. We provide concrete approximation schemes that are necessarily infinite and observe that in the ELU-to-EL case finite approximations tend to exist in practice and are guaranteed to exist when the original ontology is acyclic. In contrast, neither of this is the case for ELU ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ and for ALC-to-EL ⊥ approximations. We also define a notion of approximation tailored towards ontology-mediated querying, connect it to subsumption-based approximations, and identify a case where finite approximations are guaranteed to exist.
Introduction
Despite prominent standardization efforts such as OWL, a large variety of description logics (DLs) continues to be used as ontology languages. In fact, ontology designers choose a DL suitable for their purposes based on many factors including expressive power, computational properties, and tool support [Baader et al., 2017] . Since ontology engineering frequently involves (partial) reuse of existing ontologies, this raises the problem of converting an ontology written in some source DL L S into a desired target DL L T . A particularly important case is ontology approximation where L T is a fragment of L S , studied for example in [Pan and Thomas, 2007; Ren et al., 2010; Botoeva et al., 2010; Carral et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2015; Bötcher et al., 2019] .
In practice, ontology approximation is often done in an ad hoc way by dropping all statements from the source ontology O S that are not expressible in L T , or at least the inexpressible parts of such statements. It is well-known that this results in incomplete approximations, that is, there will be knowledge in O S that could be expressed in L T , but is not contained in the resulting approximated ontology. The degree and nature of the resulting incompleteness is typically neither understood nor analyzed. One reason for this unsatisfactory situation might be the fact that it is by no means easy to construct complete approximations and, even worse, finite complete approximations are not guaranteed to exist. This was studied in depth in [Bötcher et al., 2019] where ontologies formulated in expressive Horn DLs such as Horn-SHIF and ELI are approximated in tractable Horn DLs such as EL. For example, it is shown there that finite complete ELI-to-EL approximations do not exist even in extremely simple cases including those occurring in practice. [Bötcher et al., 2019] then lays out a new research program for ontology approximation that consists in mapping out the structure of complete (infinite) ontology approximations as a tool for guiding informed decisions when constructing incomplete (finite) approximations in practice, and also to enable a proper understanding of the degree and nature of incompleteness.
In this paper, we consider L S -to-L T ontology approximation where L S is a non-Horn DL such as ALC and L T is a Horn DL such as EL. Arguably, these are extremely natural cases of ontology approximation given that Horn vs. non-Horn is nowadays the most important classification criterion for DLs [Baader et al., 2017] . Non-Horn DLs include expressive features such as negation and disjunction and require 'reasoning by cases' which is potentially costly, but also have considerably higher expressive power than Horn DLs. Horn DLs, in contrast, enjoy favourable properties such as the existence of universal models and of 'consequencebased' reasoning algorithms that avoid reasoning by cases [Cucala et al., 2019] . Despite the naturalness, however, it turns out that this is a challenging endeavour.
We start with the fundamental case of ELU -to-EL approximation. Given an ELU ontology O S , we thus aim to find a (potentially infinite) EL ontology O T such that for all EL concepts C, D in the signature of The last two lines of O T illustrates that EL consequences of ELU ontologies can be rather non-obvious.
We first prove that finite approximations need not exist in the ELU -to-EL case and that depth bounded approximations may be non-elementary in size. Our main result is then a concrete approximation scheme that makes explicit the structure of complete infinite approximations and aims to keep as much structure of the original ontology as possible. An interesting and, given the results in [Bötcher et al., 2019] , surprising feature of our scheme is that it can be expected to often deliver finite approximations in practical cases. We perform experiments based on the Manchester ontology corpus that confirm this expectation. We also show that if O S is an acyclic ELU ontology, then a finite EL approximation always exist (though it need not be acyclic). The finite approximations that we obtain are too large to be directly used in practice. Nevertheless, we view our results as rather positive and believe that in practice approximations of reasonable size should often exist, as in Example 1 above. A 'push button' technology for constructing them, however, is outside of the scope of this paper.
We then proceed to the cases of ELU ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ and ALCto-EL ⊥ approximations which turn out to be closely related to each other. They also turn out to be significantly different from the ELU-to-EL case in that finite approximations do not exist in extremely simple (and practical) cases, much like in the Horn approximation cases studied in [Bötcher et al., 2019] . Also, finite approximations of acyclic ontologies are no longer guaranteed to exist. While this is certainly not good news, it is remarkable that the addition of the ⊥ symbol has such a dramatic effect. We again provide an (infinite) approximation scheme.
Finally, we propose a notion of approximation that is tailored towards applications in ontology-mediated querying [Calvanese et al., 2009] and show that it is intimately related to the subsumption-based approximations that we had studied before. Remarkably, if we concentrate on atomic queries (AQs) as the actual queries, then we obtain finite approximations even in the ALC-to-EL ⊥ case. Compared to [Kaminski et al., 2016] , we do not require the preservation of all query answers, but only of a maximal subset thereof, and our method is applicable to all ontologies formulated in the source DL rather than to a syntactically restricted class. We also observe an interesting application to the rewritability of ontology-mediated queries.
All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Preliminaries
Let N C and N R be disjoint and countably infinite sets of concept names and role names. In the description logic ALC, concepts C, D are built according to the syntax rule C, D ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | A | ¬C | C ⊓ D | C ⊔ D | ∃r.C | ∀r.C where A ranges over N C and r over N R . The depth of a concept is the nesting depth of the constructors ∃r and ∀r in it. For example, the concept ∃r.B ⊓ ∃r.∃s.A is of depth 2. We introduce other DLs as fragments of ALC. An ELU ⊥ concept is an ALC concept that does not contain negations ¬C and value restrictions ∀r.C. An EL ⊥ concept is an ELU ⊥ concept that does not contain disjunctions C ⊔ D. ELU concepts and EL concepts are defined likewise, but additionally forbid the use of the bottom concept ⊥. For any of these DLs L, an L ontology is a set of concept inclusions (CIs) C ⊑ D where C and D are L con-cepts. While ontologies used in practice have to be finite, we frequently consider also infinite ontologies. W.l.o.g,, we assume that all occurrences of ⊥ in ELU ⊥ ontologies are in CIs of the form C ⊑ ⊥, where C does not contain ⊥. An acyclic ontology O is a set of concept inclusions A ⊑ C and concept equivalences A ≡ C where A is a concept name (that is, it cannot be a compound concept), the left-hand sides are unique, and O does not contain a definitiorial cycle A 0 ⊲⊳ 1 C 0 , . . . , A n ⊲⊳ n C n , ⊲⊳ i ∈ {⊑, ≡}, where C i contains A i+1 mod n+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. An equivalence A ≡ C can be viewed as two CIs A ⊑ C and C ⊑ A and thus every acyclic ontology is an ontology in the original sense.
A signature Σ is a set of concept and role names, uniformly referred to as symbols. We use sig(X) to denote the set of symbols used in any syntactic object X such as a concept or an ontology. If sig(X) ⊆ Σ, we also say that X is over Σ.
The size of a (finite) syntactic object X, denoted ||X||, is the number of symbols needed to write it, with concept and role names counting as one.
The semantics of concepts and ontologies is defined in terms of interpretations I = (∆ I , · I ) as usual, see [Baader et al., 2017 ]. An interpretation I satisfies a CI
we then also say that the CI is a consequence of O. Subsumption can be decided in polynomial time in EL ⊥ and is EXPTIME-complete between ELU and ALC [Baader et al., 2017] . We now give our main definition of approximation. 
We may refer to ω-bounded L T approximations simply as L T approximations.
We refer to the "if" direction of the biimplication in Definition 1 as soundness of the approximation and to the "only if" direction as completeness. Trivially, infinite approximations always exist: take as O T the set of all L CIs C ⊑ D with C, D over Σ and O S |= C ⊑ D. With L S -to-L T approximation, L S a DL and L T a fragment of L S , we mean the task to approximate an L S ontology in L T .
has a finite projective EL approximation, but every nonprojective EL-approximation is infinite.
In fact, a finite projective EL approximation O T of the ontology O S from Proposition 1 is obtained from O S by replacing the CI in the first line with
The intuitive reason for why O S has no finite non-projective EL approximation is that O S |= A ′ ⊓ ∃r 2n .A ⊑ M for all n ≥ 0. Proposition 1 indicates that projective approximations are preferable. Since they also seem perfectly acceptable from an application viewpoint, we thus concentrate on the projective case and from now on mean projective approximations whenever we speak of approximations.
To illustrate the challenges of ELU -to-EL approximation, it is instructive to consider a candidate approximation scheme that might be suggested by Proposition 1. We use sub(O S ) to denote the set of all subconcepts of (concepts in) the ontology O S and sub − (O) to denote the restriction of sub(O) to concept names and existential restrictions ∃r.C. We use Con(O S ) to denote the set of all non-empty conjunctions of concepts from sub − (O S ) without repetitions and Dis(O S ) to mean the set of all disjunctions of concepts from Con(O S ) without repetitions. Now, a (finite projective) candidate EL approximation scheme is given in Figure 1 where C ranges over sub(O S ) and D 1 , D 2 , D 3 range over Dis(O S ). It indeed yields an approximation when applied to the ontology O S in Proposition 1. It also has, however, two major problems. First, the syntactic structure of O S is lost completely, which is undesirable in practice where ontologies are the result of a careful modeling effort. We could include all EL concept inclusions from O S in the approximation, but this would be purely cosmetic since all such CIs are already implied. Second, the approximation is incomplete. In fact, finite projective approximations need not exist while the approximation in Figure 1 is always finite. Proposition 2. The ELU ontology
The intuitive reason for why O S has no finite EL approximation is that O S |= ∃r.(A ⊓ ∃s n .⊤) ⊑ ∃r.(B 1 ⊓ ∃s n .⊤) for all n ≥ 0.
The ontology in Proposition 2 can be varied to show that even bounded depth approximations can get very large. The function tower : N × N → N is defined as tower(0, n) := n and tower(k + 1, n) := 2 tower(k,n) . Proposition 3. Let O n S be obtained from the ontology O S in Proposition 2 by replacing the bottommost CI with
Then for all n, ℓ ≥ 1 and any ℓ-bounded EL approximation
We present a more careful approximation scheme that aims to preserve concept inclusions from O S , is complete, and yields a finite approximation in many practical cases.
Let O S be an ELU ontology to be approximated. As a preliminary, we assume that for all CIs C ⊑ D ∈ O S , C is an EL concept. In fact, if this is not the case, then we can rewrite O S by exhaustively replacing every disjunction C ⊔D that occurs (possibly as a subconcept) on the left-hand side of a concept inclusion in O S with a fresh concept name X C⊔D and adding the inclusions C ⊑ X C⊔D and D ⊑ X C⊔D . It is not hard to see that the resulting ontology O ′ S is of size polynomial in ||O S || and a conservative extension of O S in the sense that Figure 2 where D 1 , D 2 range over Dis(O S ) and D ranges over Dis − (O S ), the set of all disjunctions in Dis(O S ) that have at least two disjuncts. We still have to define the notation and terminology used in the figure. For an ELU concept C such that all disjunctions in C are from Dis(O S ), we use C ↑ to denote the EL concept obtained from C by replacing every outermost D ∈ Dis − (O S ) with a fresh concept name X D . By decorating an EL concept C with disjunctions from Dis(O S ) at leaves, we mean to replace any number of leaf occurrences of a concept name A by a concept A ⊓ D where D ∈ Dis(O S ). Finally, we use the following.
Let us explain the proposed approximation. The first three lines of Figure 2 can be viewed as a more careful version of the first four lines of Figure 1 . In the first line, we preserve the structure of O S as long as it lies outside the scope of a disjunction operator. This is not cosmetic as in the candidate approximation in Figure 2 : since we introduce the concept names X D only when a disjunction is 'derived' (first line) and only for disjunctions D ∈ Dis − (O S ), O ℓ T is no longer guaranteed to be an approximation when the first line in Figure 2 is dropped. The last line of the approximation addresses the effect illustrated by Example 2. It is strong enough so that a counterpart of the second last line in Figure 1 is not needed.
An interesting aspect of our approximation is that it turns out to be finite in many practical cases. In this respect, a very important feature is the requirement for the concept G in the last line to be O S -generatable: it is easy to see that O ℓ T is finite for all ℓ < ω and that O ω T is finite if and only if there are only finitely many EL concepts that are O S -generatable, up to logical equivalence; we then say that O S is finitely generating. Since in practice ontologies tend to have a simple structure, one might expect that they often enjoy this property. Below, we report about experiments that confirm this expectation.
How does the approximation scheme in Figure 2 relate to the examples given above? For the ontologies O S in Example 1 and in Proposition 1, our approximation O ω T contains all CIs in the approximation O T given in place. Of course, O ω T also contains a lot of additional CIs that, however, do not result in any new consequences C ⊑ D with C, D EL concepts over sig(O S ). It seems very difficult to identify up front those CIs that are really needed. We can remove them after constructing O ω T by repeatedly deciding conservative extensions , but this is not practical given the size of O ω T . Nevertheless, both ontologies O S are finitely generating and thus O ω T is finite. In Example 1, the O S -generatable concepts are ⊤ and MainJob, Reduced, and MainJob ⊓ Reduced (up to logical equivalence) while there are no O S -generatable concepts for Proposition 1. For Proposition 2, there are infinitely many O S -generatable concepts such as ∃s n .⊤ for all n.
Experiments. We have performed experiments on the seven non-trivial ELU ontologies that are part of the Manchester OWL corpus. 1 The size of the ontologies ranges from 113 to 813 concept inclusions and equalities. All ontologies use disjunction on the right-hand side of CIs (thus in a nontrivial way) and none of them is acyclic. We have been able to show that all these ontologies are finitely generating and thus the approximation O ω T is finite. Our experiments rely on the following observation. Lemma 1. O S is not finitely generating iff for every n ≥ 0, there is an ∃r.D ∈ sub(O S ) that occurs on the right-hand side of a CI and a sequence r 1 , . . . , r n of role names from O S such that O S |= D ⊑ ∃r 1 . · · · .∃r n .⊤.
We use role inclusions to deal with the fact that there are exponentially many sequences r 1 , . . . , r n of length n. Lemma 1 can also be used to show the following. Theorem 1. It is decidable whether a given ELU -ontology O S is finitely generating.
By what was said above, this implies that it is decidable whether the approximation O ω T from Figure 2 is finite. Soundness and Completeness. We now establish soundness and completeness of the proposed approximation, the main result in this section.
While soundness is easy to show, completeness is remarkable subtle to prove. It is stated by the following lemma which shows that our approximation O ℓ T is actually stronger than required in that it preserves all EL subsumptions C ⊑ D with D of depth at most ℓ and C of unrestricted depth.
The proof of Lemma 2 is the most substantial one in this paper. It uses a chase procedure for ELU ontologies that is specifically tailored towards proving completeness in that it is deterministic rather than disjunctive and mimics the concept inclusions in Figure 2 . Showing that this chase is complete is far from trivial.
Fewer Symbols. The number of fresh concept names X D in O ℓ T is double exponential in ||O S || since the number of disjunctions in Dis − (O) is. We show that O ℓ T can be rewritten into an ontology O ℓ T so that it uses only single exponentially many fresh concept names and is still an ℓ-bounded approximation of O S . The idea is to transition from disjunctive normal form to conjunctive normal form, that is, to replace each concept name X D , D ∈ Dis − (O), with a conjunction of concept names Y D ′ where D ′ is a disjunction of concepts from sub − (O), rather than conjunctions thereof.
Acyclic Ontologies. Using Lemma 1, one can show that O ω T is finite whenever O S is an acyclic ELU ontology. In fact, the length n of role sequences with the properties stated in the lemma is bounded by ||O S || if O S is acyclic. Theorem 4. Every acyclic ELU ontology has a finite EL approximation.
There is, however, more that we can say about acyclic ontologies. We first observe that there are acyclic ELU ontologies that have finite EL approximations, but no EL approximation that is an acyclic ontology. Example 2. Consider the acyclic ELU ontology Figure 2 , except that in the last line, F ranges only over concept names (not decorated with disjunctions) rather than compound concepts, a significant simplication. 
ALC-to-EL ⊥ Approximation
We consider ELU ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ and ALC-to-EL ⊥ approximation which turn out to be closely related to each other and significantly different from ELU -to-EL approximation.
It immediately follows from the results in Section 3 that finite approximations are guaranteed to exist neither in the ELU ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ nor in the ALC-to-EL ⊥ case. However, while we have argued that finite ELU-to-EL approximations can be expected to exist in many practical cases, this does not appear to be true for ELU ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ and ALC-to-EL ⊥ . The following example illustrates the problem. Example 3. Consider the ELU ⊥ ontology Note that the ontology O S in Example 4 is acyclic and thus in contrast to the ELU-to-EL case, finite EL ⊥ approximations of acyclic ALC ontologies need not exist. In a sense, Example 3 shows the same negative result for the ELU ⊥to-EL ⊥ case. While the ontology used there is not strictly acyclic, acyclic ontologies do not make much sense in the case of ELU ⊥ and additionally admitting CIs C 1 ⊓ C 2 ⊑ ⊥ as used in Example 3 seems to be the most modest extension possible that incorporates ⊥ in a meaningful way.
Despite these additional challenges, we can extend the approximation given in Section 3 to ELU ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ and to ALC-to-EL ⊥ when we are willing to drop O S -generatability and, as a consequence, accept the fact that approximations are infinite unless they are depth bounded. Note that this is 2 A formal proof is analogous to that of Proposition 2.
also true in the case of L-to-EL approximation when L is an expressive Horn DL such as ELI [Bötcher et al., 2019] .
We first reduce ALC-to-EL ⊥ approximations to ELU ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ approximations. Let O S be an ALC ontology. We can transform O S into an ELU ⊥ ontology as follows:
1. replace each subconcept ∀r.C with ¬∃r.¬C; 2. select a concept ¬C such that C contains no negation, replace all occurrences of ¬C with the fresh concept name A ¬C , and add the CIs
It thus suffices to consider ELU ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ approximations. Figure 2 where again D ranges over Dis − (O S ) and D 1 , D 2 range over Dis(O S ); both Dis(O S ) and Dis − (O S ) are defined exactly as for ELU ontologies. Point 1 can be viewed as an optimization that sometimes helps to avoid the expensive last line. There, a top-level conjunct means a concept F i if F takes the form F 1 ⊓ · · · ⊓ F n , n ≥ 1. In the appendix, we point out another non-trivial such optimization. Theorem 6. O ℓ T is an ℓ-bounded EL ⊥ approximation of O S . The proof of Theorems 2 and 6 also establishes another result that will turn out to be interesting in the context of ontology-mediated queries in Section 5. We use O − T to denote the restriction of O ω T to the (instantiations) of the first three lines in Figure 3 (equivalently: Figure 2 
Approximations and Query Evaluation
The notion of approximations given in Section 2 is tailored towards preserving subsumptions. In ontology-mediated querying, in contrast, the main aim of approximation is to preserve as many query answers as possible. We propose a suitable notion of approximation and show that the results obtained in the previous sections have interesting applications also in ontology-mediated querying.
Let N I be a countably infinite set of individual names disjoint from N C and N R . An ABox is a finite set of concept assertions A(a) and role assertions r(a, b) where A ∈ N C , r ∈ N R , and a, b ∈ N I . We use Ind(A) to denote the set of individual names in the ABox A. An interpretation I satisfies a concept assertion A(a) if a ∈ A I and a role assertion
An ontology-mediated query (OMQ) is a triple Q = (O, Σ, q) with O an ontology, Σ an ABox signature, and q an actual query. While conjunctive queries (CQs) and unions of CQs are a popular choice for formulating q and our central Definition 3 below makes sense also for these richer query languages, for simplicity we concentrate on atomic queries (AQs) A(x) where A is a concept name and EL queries (ELQs) C(x) where C an EL concept. We shall also mention ALC queries (ALCQs) C(x) where C is an ALC concept. Note that all such queries are unary. We use ELQ(Σ) to denote the language of all ELQs that use only symbols from signature Σ. Let (L, Q) denote the OMQ language that contains all OMQs Q in which O is formulated in DL L and q in query language Q, such as in (EL, AQ).
Let
A natural definition of ontology approximation in the context of OMQs is as follows. Definition 3. Let O S be an ALC ontology, L T one of the DLs from Section 2, and Q a query language.
Informally, Point 1 is a soundness condition and Point 2 formalizes what it means 'to preserve as many query answers as possible'. It is important to point out that if O T is an L T approximation of O S w.r.t. Q, then this does not imply that the OMQs (O S , Σ, q) and (O T , Σ, q) are equivalent for all q and Σ as in Definition 3 and the following example shows that this is actually impossible to achieve. However, Point 2 of Definition 3 ensures that (O T , Σ, q) is the best approximation of (O S , Σ, q) from below among all OMQs from (L T , Q).
However, there is no OMQ in (EL, ELQ) that is equivalent to (O S , {r}, A(x)) since it would have to return a as an answer on the ABox {r(a, a)}, but not on the ABox {r(a, b), r(b, a)}.
No OMQ from (EL, ELQ) has this property.
It turns out that the approximations from Sections 3 and 4 are also useful in the context of Definition 3 when we choose ELQ or AQ as the query language. In particular, it follows from Theorem 7 that every ALC ontology O S has a finite EL ⊥ approximation w.r.t. AQ, which is the fragment O − T of the approximation scheme proposed in Section 4.
We close with an interesting application of Theorem 8.
The topic of rewriting an OMQ into a simpler query language has received a lot of interest in the literature, see for example [Calvanese et al., 2007; Gottlob et al., 2014; Kaminski et al., 2016; Feier et al., 2019] and references therein.
. The latter is decidable [Bienvenu et al., 2014] and by Condition 2 of Definition 3, the answer is 'yes' if and only if Q is (EL ⊥ , AQ)-rewritable. We can extend this result to (ALC, ALCQ) since every OMQ from this language is equivalent to one from (ALC, AQ). Via the results in [Feier et al., 2018] , this result even extends further to a certain class of conjunctive queries.
Theorem 9. Given an OMQ Q ∈ (ALC, ALCQ), it is decidable whether Q is (EL ⊥ , AQ)-rewritable.
Conclusion
We have investigated the structure and finiteness of ontology approximations when transitioning from non-Horn DLs to Horn DLs. We believe that our results shed significant light on the situation. It remains, however, an important and challenging topic for future work to push our techniques further towards immediate practical applicability. Also, there are many other relevant cases of approximation. As a first step, one might think about extending the DLs considered in this paper with role inclusions. It might further be interesting to study the problem to decide whether a given (finite) candidate is an approximation of a given ontology. We expect this to be quite non-trivial. A related result in [Lutz et al., 2012] states that it is between EXPTIME and 2EXPTIME to decide whether a given ELU ontology O S of a restricted syntactic form has a finite complete EL approximation. Without the restriction, even decidability is open.
A Proofs for Propositions 1, 2, and 4
We state the results to be proved again. Proposition 1. The ELU ontology
Proof. We show that O S has no finite non-projective EL approximation. Observe that the ontology O obtained from O S by replacing the topmost CI with the infinite set
is an infinite non-projective EL approximation of O S . Now assume for a proof by contradiction that there exists a finite non-projective EL approximation of O S . Then, by compactness of reasoning in EL, there exists a finite subset
To prove Proposition 2 and 4, we use the following lemma from 
O S and use only the symbols r 1 , r 2 , A 1 ,Â 1 , . . . , A n ,Â n . It is straightforward to construct such a set Ω and that has size at least tower(ℓ, n). It then suffices to show that for every 
and now one can readily show by induction on i, and using that O S |= D ⊑ ∃r 1 . · · · ∃r n .⊤, that
and we have found the sequence of role names of length n +
is a tree and there are no multi-edges, that is, r(a, b), s(a, b) ∈ A implies r = s. Every EL concept C can be viewed as a ditree-shaped ABox A C in an obvious way.
We will sometimes also use extended ABoxes, that is, ABoxes A that can also contain concept assertions of the form C(a), C a compound concept. If all concepts that occur in such assertions are formulated in a description logic L, we speak of extended L-ABoxes. If A is an extended ABox, then we use A − to denote the non-extended ABox obtained from A by removing all assertions C(a) where C is not a concept name.
We next introduce a standard chase procedure for EL ontologies. The procedure uses ABoxes as a data structure. Let O be an EL ontology. There is a single chase rule that can be applied to an ABox A:
• if C ⊑ D ∈ O and A |= C(a), then a copy of A D whose individuals are disjoint from those in A and replace A with the union of A and A D , identifying the root of the latter with a.
The chase starts with an ABox A 0 and exhaustively applies the above rule in a fair way, resulting in sequence of ABoxes A 0 , A 1 , . . . . The result of the chase is the (potentially infinite) ABox i≥0 A i obtained in the limit, denoted ch O (A).
The result is unique since the chase is oblivious, that is, a rule can applied to C ⊑ D and C(a) even if A |= D(a) already holds. A proof of the following is standard and omitted.
, for all EL concepts C and D.
C.2 Main Proof
We start with soundness.
. be a sequence of ABoxes produced by the EL chase of A C0 with O ω T . Clearly, all ABoxes A 0 , A 1 , . . . are ditree-shaped and can thus be viewed as an EL concept C i . For an EL concept C over sig(O ω T ), let C ↓ be the ELU concept obtained from C by replacing every X D with D ∈ Dis(O S ). We prove the following by induction on i.
, and let A i+1 be obtained from A i by taking a copy of A D whose individuals are disjoint from those in A i and defining A i+1 as the union of A i and A D , identifying the root of the latter with a.
as required and thus the claim is proved.
From
We now address completeness, starting with the essential Lemma 6 below. Preparing for the case of ELU ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ approximations, we state and prove the lemma directly for this case. This requires a few preliminaries.
Let O be an ELU ⊥ ontology. For every EL concept C, we define Dis O (C) as in the case without ⊥. This can now be the empty disjunction, which we identify with ⊥. In fact, C is satisfiable w.r.t. O if and only if Dis O (C) = ⊥. We set ⊥ ↑ = ⊥. We further associate with every EL concept C a disjunction Dis EL O (C) that contains a disjunct S for every set S ⊆ sub − (O) such that there is a model I of O and a d ∈ C I with S = {E ∈ sub − (O) | d ∈ E I and E is an EL concept} while this is not true for any proper subset of S. If Dis EL O (C) consists of a single disjunct that is the empty conjunction, we identify it with ⊤. The empty disjunction is again identified with ⊥.
For the following lemma, we assume that O S is an ELU ⊥ ontology. The lemma refers to O − T . Note that when O S is formulated in ELU , then O − T consists of all instantiations of the first three lines of Figure 2 and that for ELU ⊥ , the same is true for Figure 3 . However, the first three lines of these figures are identical.
We prove Lemma 6 by first introducing a special chase procedure for ELU ⊥ ontologies that is specifically tailored towards our approximations. Unlike more standard chase procedures for ELU ⊥ , our chase is deterministic rather than disjunctive.
We define an entailment notion A ⊢ C(a) between extended ELU ⊥ ABoxes A and ELU ⊥ concepts C as follows:
• A ⊢ ⊤(a) always holds; Let A be an ABox and O an ELU ⊥ ontology. The chase produces produces a sequence of ABoxes A = A 0 , A 1 , A 2 , · · · such that A i ⊆ A i+1 for all i ≥ 0. Although different sequences can be produced, the limit i≥0 A i will be unique and we call it the result of chasing A with O. We call an individual in i≥0 A i original if it already occurs in A and anonymous otherwise. In the ABoxes A i , anonymous individuals can be marked or not. Each ABox A i+1 is obtained from A i by chasing a single step with O, that is, A i+1 is obtained from A i in one of the following ways:
1. choose C ⊑ D ∈ O and a ∈ Ind(A) with A ⊢ C(a) and add D(a); 2. choose C 1 ⊓ C 2 (a) ∈ A and add C 1 (a), C 2 (a); 3. choose ∃r.C(a) ∈ A and add r(a, b), C(b) for a fresh b;
we say that b was introduced for C; Note that Rules 1-3 implement Line 1 of our EL approximations O ℓ T while Rules 4 and 5 correspond to Lines 2 and 3 of the approximation. Rules 6-7 are there to deal with anonymous individuals which behave in a different way than original ones.
We require that the chase is fair, that is, every possible way to chase a single step is eventually used. Note that our chase is oblivious, that is, a chase rule can be applied even if its 'consequence' is already there. This implies that the results of the chase, which we denote with ch sp O (A), is unique up to isomorphism.
The main property that we require of the chase is the following completeness property.
Lemma 7. Let O be an ELU ⊥ ontology and C 0 an EL concept over sig(O S ). Then ch sp
. Since the proof of Lemma 7 is rather laborious, we defer it to Section C.3.
We now return to the proof of Lemma 6. Let A 0 , A 1 , . . . be a sequence of ABoxes generated by chasing A C0 = A 0 with O S using the special chase introduced above. It is easy to see that all extended ABoxes A 0 , A 1 , . . . are ditree-shaped and can thus be viewed as ELU ⊥ concepts C 0 , C 1 , . . . in which all disjunctions are from Dis(O S ). Note that also the ABox assertions C(a) ∈ A i with C a compound concept or ⊥ give raise to subconcepts in C i .
To prove the claim, let i ≥ 0. We make a case distinction according to the chase rule with which A i+1 is obtained from A i : 1. Then there is a C ⊑ D ∈ O S and an a ∈ Ind(A) such that A i ⊢ C(a) and A i+1 = A i ∪{D(a)}. Let E a be the subconcept of C i that corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in A i and let F a be the subconcept of C i+1 that corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in A i+1 . Since C is an EL concept,
Let E a be the subconcept of C i that corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in A i and let F a be the subconcept of C i+1 that corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in A i+1 . Then
as required. 5. Similar to the previous case, using the third line of O − T .
6. Then there is a D(a) ∈ A i with D ∈ Dis − (O S ), a anonymous and introduced for C, and A i+1 = A i ∪ {Dis OS (C)(a)}. Let E a be the subconcept of C i that corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in A i and let F a be the subconcept of C i+1 that corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in A i+1 . Since a was introduced for C, C(a) ∈ A i and thus ∅ |= E a ⊑ C. Since
Similar to the previous case.
This finishes the proof of the claim. By Lemma 7, ch sp OS (A C0 ) ⊢ Dis EL OS (C 0 )(a 0 ) and thus A i ⊢ Dis EL OS (C 0 )(a 0 ) for some i. First assume that Dis EL OS (C 0 ) contains more than one disjunct. Then, by def-
It again remains to apply the claim. Finally assume that Dis EL OS (C 0 ) = ⊥. Then ⊥(b) ∈ A i for some b and thus ∅ |= C ↑ i ⊑ ⊥. We can once more apply the claim. This finishes the proof of Lemma 6. Now back to the proof of completeness, that is, of Lemma 2. We need some more preliminaries. 
In A C , the root a 0 has outgoing edges r 1 (a 0 , b 1 ), . . . , r m (a 0 , b m ). Extend A C to a model I as follows: For a ditree-shaped ABox A and k ≥ 0, we use A| k to denote the result of removing from A all individuals on levels larger than k and C a A to denote the subABox of A rooted at a viewed as an EL concept. To prepare for the case of ELU ⊥ -to-EL approximations, we establish the following lemma directly for ELU ⊥ instead of for ELU . We are now in a position to prove Lemma 2.
Proof. Assume that O S |= C 0 ⊑ D 0 with C 0 , D 0 EL concepts over sig(O S ) such that the role depth of D 0 is at most ℓ. It clearly suffices to consider the cases where D 0 is a concept name and where it is of the form ∃r.E 0 .
We start with the former, so let
To see this, first assume that Dis EL OS (C 0 ) contains a single disjunct. Then A must be a conjunct of Dis EL OS (C 0 ) and it suffices to apply Lemma 6. Now assume that Dis EL OS (C 0 ) has more than one disjunct, that is, it is in Figure 2 ) and thus it again suffices to apply Lemma 6.
The case where D 0 = ∃r.E 0 is a consequence of the following claim. For each a ∈ Ind(A C0 ), we write C a 0 as an abbreviation for C a AC 0 . Claim. For all a ∈ Ind(A C0 ) and EL concepts ∃r.E of depth ℓ−depth(a), O S |= C a 0 ⊑ ∃r.E implies O ℓ T |= C a 0 ⊑ ∃r.E. Proof of claim. The proof is by induction on the co-depth of a.
Induction start. Then a is a leaf in A C0 and thus C a 0 does not have any top-level conjuncts of the form ∃r.E ′ . Lemma 8 thus yields that E is O S -generatable. Thus C a 0 ⊑ ∃r.E is a CI in O ℓ T . Induction step. Then a is a non-leaf in A C0 . We distinguish two cases.
Since we have already shown Lemma 2 for the case where D 0 is a concept name, we obtain
Let A be the ditree-shaped subABox of A C0 rooted at a and let A ± be the extended ABox obtained from A| k , with k the depth of ∃r.E, by adding Dis EL OS (C c A ) ↑ (c) whenever c is a leaf in A| k . Applying Lemma 9 to A and A ± and with ∃r.E in place of ∃r.C, we
for all leaves c in A| k . Together with the construction of A ± and C ± , this yields that
C.3 Soundness and Completeness of the Special Chase
Our main aim is to establish Lemma 7. We start, however, with proving soundness of the chase. While this is interesting in its own right, we are not going to use it directly in the context of approximations. It is, however, an ingredient to the subsequent completeness proof.
Lemma 10. Let C 0 be an EL concept and O an ELU ⊥ ontology. Then ch sp We next observe the following.
Claim. if A i ⊢ D(a), a ∈ Ind(A i ) and D ∈ Dis(O), and h is an extended homomorphism from A i to I, then h(a) ∈ D I .
The claim can be proved by induction on the structure of D.
If D takes the form D 1 ⊓ D 2 or ∃r.D 1 , then this is straightforward using the semantics and induction hypothesis. If D is ⊤, ⊥, a concept name, or of the form D 1 ⊔ D 2 (note that in the latter case A i ⊢ D(a) implies D(a) ∈ A i ), then this is immediate by definition of extended homomorphisms.
We show by induction on i that for each i ≥ 0, there is an extended homomorphism h i from A i to I with h(a 0 ) = d. This is trivial for i = 0 since d ∈ C I 0 . For i ≥ 0, we make a case distinction according to the rule that was applied to obtain A i+1 from A i : 1. Then there is a C ⊑ D ∈ O and an a ∈ Ind(A) such that A i ⊢ C(a) and A i+1 = A i ∪{D(a)}. By the claim,
∈ D I and consequently h i can be extended to an extended homomorphism h i+1 from A i+1 to I.
Trivial.
3. Trivial. 
Then there are
For the above definition, it is important to note that sub − (O) ⊆ Dis(O) and thus also all C ∈ sub − (O) with ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ C(a) contribute to the definition of D a . We observe the following:
In the very special case that this disjunction consists of a single disjunct that contains all concepts from sub − (O) as conjuncts, Dis O (D 1 ⊓ D 2 ) = D a and Rule 4 applied to D 1 and D 2 yields D a (a) ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ) as required. Otherwise, we find some D ′ with at least two disjuncts such that ∅ |=
We can apply Rule 4 again to show D ′ 2 (a) ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ). Since D ′ 2 has at least two disjuncts, we can proceed in the same way applying Rule 4 to D ′ 2 , D 3 , then to D ′ 3 , D 4 , and so on. In the last step, we can clearly choose D a as D ′ k . Finally, another application of Rule 4 with D 1 = D 2 = D a and D 3 = D yields D(a) ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ). Note that it follows from (P2) and the assumption that ⊥(a) / ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ) that D a = ⊥, that is, D a has at least one disjunct. We now consider each original disjunctive a ∈ Ind(ch sp O (A C0 )), identify a disjunct E a of D a and extend ch sp
We then show that no new applications of chase rules are possible afterwards, with the possible exception of applications of Rule 3 to original disjunctive individuals a. We also select an E a for each original non-disjunctive a, in a trivial way: E a is then the conjunction of all
We start at the root a 0 (if it is disjunctive). Recall our assumption that ch sp
Together with Rules 2 and 3, this yields ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ Dis EL O (C 0 )(a 0 ), a contradiction. Let A + denote the result of extending ch sp O (A C0 ) for E a0 as described above. We observe the following counterpart of (P1) for A + .
If ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ D(a 0 ), then this follows from (P1). Otherwise, by definition of ⊢ and construction of A + , we
We show that no new rule applications are possible, except for applications of Rule 3 to original disjunctive individuals:
• Rule 1. Assume that A + ⊢ C(a 0 ) and that C ⊑ D ∈ O. Then (P3) yields ∅ |= E a0 ⊑ C. By definition of D a0 , this implies that C is a conjunct of E a0 and thus so is each concept name and existential restriction that is a conjunct of D, implying ∅ |= E a0 ⊑ D. Consequently,
and as a consequence, C 1 (a 0 ), C 2 (a 0 ) are also in A + . • Rule 3. New applications of Rule 3 are possible only to a 0 , which is original and disjunctive.
, and thus (P1) yields ∅ |= E a0 ⊑ D 1 . Moreover, ∅ |= E a0 ⊑ D 2 by (P3). By definition of D a0 , ∅ |= E a0 ⊑ D 3 and thus D 3 (a 0 ) is in A + . • Rule 5. Trivially not applicable since a 0 has no predecessors. • Rule 6 and 7. Only apply to anonymous individuals, but a 0 is original.
This finishes the extension of ch sp O (A C0 ) at a 0 . From now on, we assume that this extension has been incorporated into ch sp O (A C0 ), that is, we write ch sp O (A C0 ) in place of A + . Trivially, property (P1) still holds for all a = a 0 and property (P2) is preserved.
We then apply the following extension as long as possible. Choose some r(b, a) ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ) with a original and disjunctive and assume that E b was already determined and ch sp O (A C0 ) extended accordingly (the latter only if b is disjunctive). We argue that there must be a disjunct E a of D a such that the following properties are satisfied:
(a) ∅ |= E a ⊑ C and ∃r.C ∈ sub(O) implies ch
. Assume that this is not the case. Let D a = E 1 ⊔ · · · ⊔ E k . For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we then find one of the following: 
due to Rules 2 and 3, this implies ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ D R (b). We distinguish two cases.
First assume that b is disjunctive. Then D b is defined and
, then this is an immediate contradiction. Otherwise, non-applicability of Rules 2 and 3 yields ch sp
, a contradiction in Case (i) and (ii), respectively.
We now extend ch sp O (A C0 ) for E a as described above. We observe the same property (P3) as above, the proof is identical:
We again show that no new rule applications are possible except applications of Rule 3 to original disjunctive individuals. We only consider those cases explicitly for which the arguments are not the same as above:
• Rule 1. Assume that A + ⊢ C(c) and that C ⊑ D ∈ O. We can use Property (a) to show that the former implies ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ C(c) whenever c = a, and thus non-applicability of Rule 1 before the extension ensures
Moreover, we can use Property (a) to show that
, and thus (P1) yields ∅ |= E a ⊑ D 1 . Moreover, ∅ |= E a ⊑ D 2 by (P3). By definition of D a , ∅ |= E a ⊑ D 2 and thus D 2 (a) is in A + . • Rule 5. Assume that r(b, c), D 1 (c) ∈ A + with D 1 (c) fresh and D 1 ∈ Dis − (O). Assume further that O |= ∃r.D 1 ⊑ D 2 . Clearly, we must have c = a. Since D 1 (a) ∈ A + and D 1 ∈ Dis − (O), A + ⊢ D 1 (a). Thus (P2) yields ∅ |= E a ⊑ D 1 and from Property (b) we obtain D 2 (b) ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊆ A + . This finishes the extension of ch sp O (A C0 ) at a. It is not hard to verify that (P1) holds for all original disjunctive a for which the extension has not yet been carried out, (P2) is preserved, and (P3) holds for all original disjunctive a for which the extension has already been carried out. In particular, the extension of ch sp O (A C0 ) at a does not invalidate (P3) for original disjunctive a ′ that have been treated earlier due to Property (a). We continue until the extension has taken place for all original disjunctive a and use E to denote the ABox that is obtained in the limit. No new rule applications are possible with the exception of applications of Rule 3 to original disjunctive individuals.
Recall that we aim to construct a model I of O with an element d such that d ∈ C I 0 \ (Dis EL O (C 0 )) I . We are going to start from E − , that is, E restricted to role assertions and atomic concept assertions, viewed as an interpretation. The resulting interpretation I, however, need not be a model of O, for two reasons. First, new applications of Rule 3 to original disjunctive individuals a are possible which means that there might be assertions ∃r.C(a) ∈ E such that a / ∈ (∃r.C) I , and this in turn means that some CIs in O might not be satisfied. And second, we have chosen disjuncts E a of the disjunctions D a at original disjunctive individuals to ensure that all disjunctions are satisfied at original individuals, but we have not ensured the same at anonymous individuals. We thus modify the initial I in two ways, which both involve grafting additional tree-shaped interpretations that we select in what follows. We first observe that ( * ) If C(a) ∈ E with a original and disjunctive, then ∅ |= E a ⊑ C.
To see this, first assume that ∃r.C(a) ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ) already before the extension to E. Then non-applicability of Rules 2 and 3 implies ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ C(a) and (P3) yields ∅ |= E a ⊑ C. Otherwise, ∅ |= E a ⊑ C by construction of E.
By ( * ) and the (semantic!) definition of D a of which E a is a disjunct, we find for each ∃r.C(a) ∈ E with a original and disjunctive, a tree model I ∃r.C(a) of O with root d such that d ∈ C I ∃r.C(a) and d ∈ F I ∃r.C(a) implies ∅ |= E a ⊑ ∃r.F for all ∃r.F ∈ sub(O).
Let Γ denote the set of individuals a in ch sp O (A C0 ) that are anonymous and marked and whose predecessor is anonymous and unmarked. 3 Let a ∈ Γ have been introduced for C a and let r(b, a) be the unique assertion of this form in ch sp O (A C0 ). Since Rule 5 is not applicable,
and since b is anonymous and not marked, Dis O (∃r.C a ) / ∈ Dis − (O). Furthermore, Dis O (∃r.C a ) is not empty since we assume that ch sp O (A C0 ) contains no assertion of the form ⊥(b). Consequently, we find a tree model I a of O with root a ∈ C Ia a such that, in the extension J of I a obtained by adding an r-predecessor b to the root a of I a , we have b ∈ (∃r.C) J iff O |= C a ⊑ C for all ∃r.C ∈ sub(O).
Construct an interpretation I as follows:
• start with E − viewed as an interpretation; • for each ∃r.C(a) ∈ E with a original and disjunctive, disjointly add the interpretation I ∃r.C(a) with root d and extend r I with (a, d); • for each a ∈ Γ, replace the subtree rooted at a with I a .
We next observe the following.
Claim 1. Let a ∈ ∆ I be an individual of ch sp O (A C0 ) and let C ∈ sub(O) be an EL concept. Then a ∈ C I implies 1. ∅ |= E a ⊑ C if a is original and disjunctive, and 2. ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ C(a) otherwise. The proof is by induction on the structure of C. In the induction start, C = A is a concept name. Since a ∈ A I , we must have A(a) ∈ E and thus E ⊢ A(a). If a is original and disjunctive, then (P3) yields ∅ |= E a ⊑ C as required. If this is not the case, then
as required. The case C = C 1 ⊓ C 2 is straightforward using the semantics and induction hypothesis. Details are left to the reader.
It thus remains to deal with the case C = ∃r.C 1 . Then a ∈ C I implies that there is a d ∈ C I 1 with (a, d) ∈ r I . We distinguish several cases. First assume that d is an individual from ch sp O (A C0 ) that is not in Γ. We have the following subcase:
1 6. d ∈ Γ and thus the root of I d .
Then d ∈ C I d 1 . By choice of I d and since ∃r.C 1 ∈ sub(O), we have O |= C d ⊑ C 1 where C d is the concept that d was introduced for. We moreover have C d (d) ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ) and by non-applicability of Rules 2 and 3 also ch sp From (a, d) ∈ r I , we obtain r(a, d) ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ), and thus ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ ∃r.C 1 (a) as required (since a cannot be original).
This finishes the proof of the claim. The proof is by induction on the structure of C. The case that C is a concept name is clear by construction of I. The case that C = C 1 ⊓ C 2 and C = ∃r.C 1 are straightforward using the fact that Rules 2 and 3 are not applicable and the induction hypothesis. It remains to deal with the case C = C 1 ⊔ C 2 . Then C 1 ⊔ C 2 (a) ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ) and thus a is disjunctive and C 1 ⊔ C 2 is a conjunct of every disjunct of D a , including the disjunct E a chosen for a during the extension of ch sp O (A C0 ). By definition of D a , it follows that some C i , i ∈ {1, 2}, is also a conjunct of E a . Thus C i (a) has been added in the extension of ch sp O (A C0 ) and it remains to apply the induction hypothesis. This finishes the proof of Claim 4
Note that I is a tree interpretation with root a 0 . By construction of I, it is clear that a 0 ∈ C I 0 . We next show that I is a model of O.
Let C ⊑ D ∈ O and let d ∈ C I . If d is in the domain of some interpretation I ∃r.C(a) or I a , then it follows from the construction of I and the fact that all interpretations I ∃r.C(a) and I a are models of O that d ∈ D I . Thus let a be an individual of ch sp O (A C0 ). We distinguish two cases. First assume that a is original and disjunctive. Then Point 1 of Claim 1 yields ∅ |= E a ⊑ C and as a consequence we have ∅ |= E a ⊑ D which implies F (a) ∈ E for all top-level conjuncts F of D. If F is a concept name, then this yields a ∈ F I by construction of I. If F takes the form ∃r.G, then the addition of I ∃r.G ensures that a ∈ (∃r.G) I . As a consequence, a ∈ D I . Now assume that a is not original or not disjunctive. It remains to show that a 0 / ∈ Dis EL O (C 0 ) I . Assume to the contrary that a 0 ∈ Dis EL O (C 0 ) I . Then there is a disjunct K of Dis EL O (C 0 ) I such that a 0 ∈ C I for every conjunct C of K. We distinguish two cases.
First assume that a 0 is disjunctive. By Point 1 of Claim 1, ∅ |= E a0 ⊑ C for all conjuncts C of K. Thus ∅ |= E a0 ⊑ Dis EL O (C 0 ), in contradiction to our choice of E a0 . Figure 2 , but with every occurrence of a concept name X D replaced by C∈KD Y C .
Theorem 3 is a consequence of the following. 
Observe that the concept names X D are not in sig(O S ) and thus the restrictions of I and I to the symbols of sig(O S ) are identical, as required. It is not straightforward to verify that I satisfies every CI C 1 ⊑ C 2 ∈ O ℓ T given that O ℓ T contains a CI C ′ 1 ⊑ C ′ 2 such that C ′ i can be obtained from C ′ by replacing each X D with D ′ ∈KD Y D ′ and that I satisfies C ′ 1 ⊑ C ′ 2 . For the converse direction, let I be a model of O ℓ T . We cannot define a corresponding I of O ℓ T by setting D ′ ∈KD Y I D ′ = X I D because we need to interpret individual concept names Y D ′ rather than conjunctions thereof. To achieve this, we resort to semantic disjunctions Dis OS (D). In fact, we define I to be like I except that 
For the '⊇' direction, we note that O S |= D ⊑ Dis OS (D ′ ) ↑ for every D ′ ∈ K D since ∅ |= D ⊑ D ′ and due to the definition of Dis OS (D ′ ). Thus O ℓ T contains the CI
In the very special case that D ′ 1 consists of a single disjunct that contains all concepts from sub − (O S ) as conjuncts, we actually have O S |= D ′′ 0 ⊓ D 1 ⊑ D, and thus we can argue as above that d ∈ (D ↑ ) I and are done since D ↑ = X D given that D ∈ Dis − (O S ).
Otherwise, we can find a D ′′
We can repeat this until we have shown that 
Based on Lemma 13, we can prove the soundness of the approximation. The proof is essentially identical to that of Lemma 5, that is, to the correctness of the approximation in the ELU -to-EL case. We omit details.
Now for completeness. Recall that we have established the central Lemma 6 already for the case where O S is an ELU ⊥ ontology. The same is true for Lemma 9.
We can thus assume that C 0 is an EL concept and it suffices to consider the cases where D 0 is ⊥, a concept name, or of the form ∃r.E 0 .
We start with the case D 0 = ⊥. Then O S |= C 0 ⊑ D 0 implies that Dis EL OS (C 0 ) is ⊥ (that is, it is the empty disjunction), and consequently Lemma 6 yields O ℓ T |= C 0 ⊑ ⊥ as required.
It thus follows from Lemma 6 that O ℓ T |= C 0 ⊑ A (see proof of Lemma 15 for details).
The case where D 0 = ∃r.E 0 is a consequence of the following claim. For each a ∈ Ind(A C0 ), we write C a 0 as an abbreviation for C a AC 0
.
Claim. For all a ∈ Ind(A C0 ) and EL concepts ∃r.E of depth
The proof is by induction on the codepth of a. Induction start. Then a is a leaf in A C0 and thus C a 0 does not have any top-level conjuncts of the form ∃r.E ′ . Thus Condition 1 from Figure 3 is satisfied for F = C a 0 . Consequently, O ℓ T contains the CI C a 0 ⊑ ∃r.E and we are done. Induction step. Then a is a non-leaf in A C0 . We distinguish two cases. Since we have already shown Lemma 15 for the case where D 0 is a concept name, we obtain Figure 3 is satisfied for F = C a 0 . Let A be the ditree-shaped subABox of A C0 rooted at a and let A ± be the extended ABox obtained from A| k , with k the depth of ∃r.E, by adding Dis EL OS (C c A ) ↑ (c) whenever c is a leaf in A| k . Applying Lemma 9 to A and A ± and with ∃r.E in place of ∃r.C, we obtain O S , A ± |= ∃r.E(a). Let C ± be A ± viewed as an EL concept decorated with disjunctions from Dis(O S ) at leaves. Since there is no top-level conjunct ∃r.E ′ in C a 0 such that O S |= E ′ ⊑ E there is no top-level conjunct ∃r.E ′ in C ± such that O S |= E ′ ⊑ E either: if this was the case with ∃r.E ′ corresponding to the successor r(a, b) of a in A ± , then we can apply Lemma 9 to the subABox of A rooted at b and the subABox of A ± rooted at b to obtain O S , A |= ∃r.E(b) and thus b in A corresponds to a top-level conjunct ∃r.E ′ in C a 0 with O S |= E ′ ⊑ E. ❏ G More Optimization for Figure 3 A further optimization of the approximation from Figure 3 is shown in Figure 4 where Dis OS (C 0 ) is defined just like Dis EL OS (C 0 ) except that the disjunctions and conjunctions are based on all concepts from sub − (O S ) rather than only those formulated in EL. Compared to Figure 3 , the second last concept inclusion and Condition 2 have been added, with the aim of invoking the expensive bottommost concept inclusion less often.
Example 6. Consider the following variation of the ELU ontology in Proposition 1:
The approximation O ω T in Figure 3 It should be clear that the new CIs in the second last line are sound and thus soundness of the approximation is not compromised. In what follows, we proof completeness. For our proof to go through, we need to assume that ⊤ is always contained in sub − (O S ). We start with observing two technical lemmas, the first one being a variant of Lemma 6.
Lemma 16. Let C 0 be an EL concept over sig(O S ) decorated with disjunctions from Dis(O S ) at leaves such that Dis OS (C 0 ) has at least two disjuncts. Then O − T |= C ↑ 0 ⊑ Dis OS (C 0 ). Proof. (sketch) The proof is almost identical to that of Lemma 6, we only sketch the differences. The fact that C 0 is no longer an EL concept but is decorated with disjunctions from Dis(O S ) at leaves is no problem at all. It is simply carried through the entire proof and does not prompt any further modifications. The fact that we work with Dis OS (C 0 ) instead of Dis EL OS (C 0 ), however, does require some changes. In the main proof of Lemma 6, we need a very slight modification of the special chase plus an adapted formulation of Lemma 7.
We define a variant ⊢ ′ of ⊢ that only differs in the clause for disjunction:
Now, the only modification of the special chase is that, in Rule 4, we replace A ⊢ D 2 (a) with A ⊢ ′ D 2 (a). The adapted formulation of Lemma 7 then reads as follows.
Claim 1. Let O be an ELU ⊥ ontology and C 0 be an EL concept over sig(O) decorated with disjunctions from Dis(O S ) at leaves such that Dis OS (C 0 ) has at least two disjuncts. Then X Dis O (C0) (a 0 ) ∈ ch sp O (A C0 ). In the proof of Lemma 6, in the claim stating that O − T |= C ↑ i ⊑ C ↑ i+1 for all i ≥ 0, we need to adapt the Case of Rule 4, as follows.
Then there are D 1 (a) ∈ A i with D 1 ∈ Dis − (O S ) and D 2 , D 3 ∈ Dis(O S ) such that A i ⊢ ′ D 2 (a), O S |= D 1 ⊓ D 2 ⊑ D 3 , and A i+1 = A i ∪ {D 3 (a)}. Let E a be the subconcept of C i that corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in A i and let F a be the subconcept of C i+1 that corresponds to the subtree rooted at a in A i+1 . Then F a = E a ⊓ D 3 . From D 1 (a) ∈ A and D 1 ∈ Dis − (O S ), we obtain that X D1 is a top-level conjunct of E ↑ a . From A i ⊢ ′ D 2 (a), we obtain an EL concept D ′ 2 with ∅ |= E ↑ a ⊑ D ′ 2 ↑ and O S |= D ′ 2 ⊑ D 2 ; we in fact obtain D 2 by 'following' A i ⊢ ′ D 2 (a) using the definition of ⊢ ′ and whenever we arrive at A i ⊢ ′ F 1 ⊔ F 2 (b) and this holds because of Case (a) from the definition of ⊢ ′ (resp. Case (b)), replacing the occurrence of F 1 ⊔ F 2 in D 2 that gave rise to this with F 1 (resp.
It remains to prove Claim 1. The proof is, in turn, a slight modification of the proof of Lemma 7. Again, we concentrate on sketching the differences. Of course, we replace Dis EL O (C 0 ) with Dis O (C 0 ) throughout the proof. Further, we replace ⊢ with ⊢ ′ in property (P1) and in (the two incarnations of) property (P3). We then go on to construct the interpretation I as before and show, also as before, that it is a model of O. It remains to show that a 0 / ∈ Dis O (C 0 ). For this, we first need to observe the following version of Claim 1 in the proof of Lemma 7. The proof is by induction on the structure of C. All cases except C = C 1 ⊔C 2 are as in the proof of Claim 1 in the proof of Lemma 7. Due to the use of ⊢ ′ in place of ⊢, however, the additional case is straightforward using the semantics and induction hypothesis.
We next argue that a 0 is disjunctive. Assume to the contrary that it is not. It can be verified that Lemma 10 (soundness of the special chase) still holds when the precondition ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ D(a 0 ) is replaced with ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ ′ D(a 0 ). Let K be the conjunction of all C ∈ sub − (O) such that a 0 ∈ C I . By Claim 2, ch sp O (A C0 ) ⊢ ′ C(a 0 ) for all such C. Thus the modified Lemma 10 yields O |= C 0 ⊑ K. Since I is a model of O, this implies that Dis O (C 0 ) has only the disjunct K, a contradiction to Dis O (C 0 ) having two disjuncts. Now back to our proof that a 0 / ∈ Dis O (C 0 ). It remains to show that a 0 / ∈ Dis O (C 0 ) I . Then there is a disjunct K of Dis O (C 0 ) I such that a 0 ∈ C I for every conjunct C of K. Since a 0 is disjunctive, Point 1 of Claim 1, yields ∅ |= E a0 ⊑ C for all conjuncts C of K. Thus ∅ |= E a0 ⊑ Dis O (C 0 ), in contradiction to our choice of E a0 . ❏ Proof. For an interpretation I and d ∈ ∆ I , let Con(d) denote the conjunction K ∈ Con(O S ) such that for all C ∈ sub − (O S ), d ∈ C I iff C is a conjunct of K. Now consider all models I of O S and all d ∈ ∆ I with d ∈ D I . We use K I,d to denote the set of all K ∈ Con(O S ) such that K = Con(e) for some r-successor e of d in I. Further, we use K to denote the set of all K I,d .
Claim. For every K I,d ∈ K, there is a K ∈ K I,d with O S |= K ⊑ C.
